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Perpetuities in California Since 1951
By LEWIS M. SlVxS*
THROUGHOUT the history of California as a state, its law concern-
ing perpetuities has undergone periodic changes. An excellent article
by Professor Everett Fraser and Professor (now Dean) Arthur M.
Sammis, on "The California Rules Against Rlestraints on Alienation,
Suspension of the Absolute -Power of Alienation, and Perpetuities,"
published in 1953,' traced this development to that date, and sum-
marzed the then existing state of the California law The writer is
here dealing with important developments in the law which have
taken place since that time. Indeed, this article may be regarded as a
sequel to the Fraser-Sammis article. 1951 has been selected as a cut-
off date because of the important legislative changes in California
rules which came into being at that time, and which were expounded
in the Fraser-Sammis article.
Before proceeding further, various terms should be explained and
distinguished. The term perpetuity, in its broadest sense, has been
used to refer to any device which tends to tie up property or to fetter
its alienability In this article, the term is not used so broadly Three
terms, however, are used, which should be precisely differentiated.
They are the common law rule against perpetuities, the rules against
suspension of the power of alienation and the rules against direct re-
straints on alienation. The common law rule against perpetuities, as it
eventually came to be recognized,2 is a rule against remoteness of vest-
ing, and is directed against contingent future interests (that is, inter-
ests limited on conditions precedent) which may vest at too remote
a time. It is now codified in section 715.2 of the California Civil Code,
which reads in part as follows: "No interest in real or personal prop-
erty shall be good unless it must vest, if at all, no later than 21 years
*Professor of Law, Umversity of California, Hastings College of the Law.
14 HASTiNGS L.. 101.
2 Doubtless m the earlier history of the rule against perpetuities, it was not entirely
clear whether it was a rule against suspension of the power of alienation, or against
remoteness of vesting. That it was a rule against remoteness of vesting was settled in
England by the case of In re Hargreaves, 43 Ci. D. 401 (1890). Gray's treatise on the
Rule Against Perpetuities, the first edition of which was published in 1886, made it
clear that the American common law rule is a rule against remoteness of vesting. How-
ever, it would seem that the New York Revisers who prepared the legislation of 1830
must have regarded suspension of the power of alienation as a large ingredient in the
rule, although they also included some statutes prohibiting'remoteness of vesting.
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after some life in being at the creation of the interest and any period
of gestation involved in the situation to winch the limitation applies."
Rules against suspension of the power of alienation were intro-
duced into the California code in 1872, and were borrowed from New
York legislation of 1830.3 Sections 715, 716 and 772 of the California
Civil Code, as originally enacted, laid down rules as to the suspension
of the power of alienation and were as follows:
§ 715. The absolute power of alienation cannot be suspended, by
any limitation or condition whatever, for a longer period than
during the continuance of the lives of persons in being at the
creation of the limitation or condition, except in the single
case mentioned in Section 772.
§ 716. Every future interest is void m its creation which, by any
possibility, may suspend the absolute power of alienation for
a longer peaod than is prescribed in this Chapter. Such
power of alienation is suspended when there are no persons
in being by whom an absolute interest in possession can be
conveyed.
§ 772. A contingent remainder in fee may be created on a prior re-
mainder in fee, to take effect in the event that the persons to
whom the first remainder is limited die under the age of
twenty-one years, or upon any other contingency by wich
the estate of such persons may be determined before they
attain majority
From these sections it is clear that the power of alienation is suspended
by the limitations of a future interest in favor of an unborn or an un-
ascertained person; for in that case there is no person or group of
persons who can convey in fee simple absolute. At an early period it
was also determined by the Califorma ,courts that the beneficial in-
terest in a trust could suspend the power of alienation, whether the
interest be contingent or vested, and- even though it be a present in-
terest.4 This result was reached by reason of certain other statutes
winch were regarded as making the equitable interest in the trust in-
alienable.5
A third type of rule, winch existed at common law,6 and which has
3 In general, as to the New York legislation on the suspension of the power of
alienation, see Sn-ms, Furotn ITmEmsTs 259, 298-303 (2d ed. 1966).
4Estate of Walkerly, 108 Cal. 627, 41 Pac. 772 (1895); Estate of Maltxman, 195
Cal. 643, 234 Pac. 898 (1925).
See Fraser & Sainnus, The California Rules Agatnst Restrants on Alienation, Sus-
peptmon of the Absolute Power of Alienation, and Perpetuities, 4 HAsrNcs L.J. 101
(19 3).
O See SnIms, op. cit. supra note 3, at ch. 22.
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long been recognized in the California Civil Code,7 is that prohibiting
direct restraints on alienation. Such restraints can arise because of an
express provision in the language of the instrument creating the in-
terest, either prohibiting alienation or providing for termination or
forfeiture of the interest on alienation. The restraint may be in the
form of a disabling restraint. Thus A may convey land to B in fee sin-
pie and expressly provide in the instrument that B shall never alienate
it. Or the restraint may be in the form of a forfeiture restraint. A may
convey land to B in fee simple "on the express condition that B shall
not alienate it, and upon such alienation the grantor may enter and
forfeit B's estate." Or A may convey land to B in fee simple "so long
as B does not alienate it." Both the disabling restraint and the forfei-
ture restraint, when applied to a legal fee simple, are void; but the
conveyance of the fee simple is good. That is to say, in each of the
three illustrations given, B has a fee simple absolute, freed from the
restriction, condition or limitation.
Californa courts have often used the term "restraint on alienation"
when they are really talking about a suspension of the power of alien-
ation. But in the case of the direct restraint on alienation, the rule is
directed against the language of restraint, the direction, condition, or
limitation, which is thereby held void. In the case of the suspension of
the power of alienation, the rule is directed against a contingent future
interest, or a beneficial interest in a trust, and the interest itself is void
ff it violates the rule.
Summary of the Period Through 1951
Before considering in detail the Califorma perpetuities law since
1951, two things will be noted, namely, (a) the important stages in
this law prior to that date, and (b) the state of the California law of
Perpetuities on that date.
The California constitution of 1849 contained the following pro-
vision, which was incorporated into the constitution of 1879:8
"No perpetuities shall be allowed except for eleemosynary purposes."
At a much later time this language was held by the Califorma courts
to enact the common law rule against perpetuities.f The permissible
period for the suspension of the power of alienation stated in the stat-
utes of 1872 was lives in being plus, in certain cases, an actual minor-
7 Section 711.
8CA. CONST. art. XI, § 16 (1849); CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 9 (1879).
9 See cases cited note 12 infra and accompanying text,
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ity 10 In 1917 the permissible period for the suspension of the power of
alienation was changed by the addition of an alternative -period of 25
years." Thus the permissible period became lives in being, plus the
restricted minority, or in the alternative a period of twenty-five years.
It was during the period between 1917 and 1951 that the courts came
to recognize the constitutional .provision already referred to as enact-
ing the common law rule against perpetuities. 12
In 1951 the permissible period, in the 'statute on the suspension of
the power of alienation was- changed to lives in being and twenty-one
years; and at the same time the statute declaring -the -common law rule
against pdrpetuities, with its period of lives in being and twenty-one
years, was enacted.13 At this -point -it' may "be asked: Were both these
stattites necessary? That is to say, since the period of time was now
the same, if an interest were void under one-of these statutes, would it
ever be valid under the other; and 'vice.versa? In so far as contingent
future interests are concerned, any interest which would be void under
the suspension of the power of-alienation statute, would also be void
under the common law rule. But some contingent future interests
which do not suspend the power. of. alienation would also be void
under the common law rule. -However, certain vested, beneficial inter-
ests m trusts, which would be void under the suspension of the power
of alienation statute, would be valid under the common law rule
against perpetuities. Thus, as the Fraser-Sammis article shows, 4 the
suspension of the power of alienation statute added nothing to the
common law rule against perpetuities except in the case of the appli-
cation of the statute to vested, beneficial interests in certain trusts.
Scope of Treatment of Post-1951 Law
The discussion of Califorma perpetuities law since 1951 which fol-
lows will deal with the following topics: (a) the legislation of 1959;
(b) the legislation of 1963; and (c) inportant judicial decisions. No
attempt will be made to consider statutory exceptions to the common
10See CAL. Crv. CO D §§ 715-16, 772 (1872) quoted earlier in this article.
11 Cal. Stat. 1917, ch. 539, amending CAL. Civ. CODE § 715 (1872).
12Estate of McCray, 204 Cal. 399, 268 Pac. 647 (1928); Estate of Sablender, 89
Cal. App. 2d 329, 201 P.2d 69 (1948); Dallapi v. Campbell, 45 Cal. App. 2d 541, 114
P.2d 646 (1941); Estate of Harrison, 22 Cal. App. 2d 28, 70 P.2d 522 (1937). Some-
times the cases also suggest that the common law rule against perpetuities is in force
because of a statute making the common law, except in certain cases, the rule of de-
cision in tbis state.
18 Cal. Stat. 1951, ch. 1463.
14 See Fraser & Samms, supra note. 5.
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law rule, such as those concerned -with profit sharing -and retirement
trusts, 5 nor are rules restricting accumulations. or .direct restraints on
alienation included.
Legislation of 1959
In 1959, pursuant to the recommendations of the Califorma Law
Revision Commission, based on a study by Professor Lowell Turren-
tine,' 6 all statutes relating to the suspension of the power of alienation
were repealed.17 Tis was also in accordance with the recommenda-
tions of the Fraser-Sanims article. 8 The reason for this was that the
invalidating of a trust because of the.suspension of the power of aliena-
tion was felt to be unduly harsh; and because it was realized that, in
most states, private trusts which might last longer than the period of
the rule against perpetuities were not thereby rendered invalid.
The elimination of statutes restricting the suspension of the power
of alienation, however, would then leave the state with no statutory rule
restricting the duration of private trusts, as such. Hence, it was felt
that new legislation on this subject should be enacted.1 9 It is true, there
was authority in. other states, in the absence of statute, to the effect
that a private trust which does not violate the common law rule against
perpetuities, but which may last longer than the period of the common
law rule, can be terminated on the concurrence of all the beneficiaries. 0
In other words, such a trust was said to be subject to internal attack,
though not subject to external attack. If, for example, such a trust were
set up in a will, the heirs could not attack it, nor secure a holding of
its invalidity. But, even though all the purposes of the trust had not
been accomplished, all the beneficiaries, being sui juris, could secure
a termination of the-trust and a transfer-of the trust corpus to-them. As
is pointed out in the report of the Law Revision Commission, 1 since
there was no judicial authority on this subject in California, a repeal of
the suspension of the power of alienation rule as applied to the dura-
tion of private trusts should be superseded by legislation as to the
duration of such trusts. Hence, California Civil'Code, section 771, was
i5 As to these trusts, see CAL. Cirv. CoDE §-715.3.16 CAxwomu LAw REvISIoN Commssiom, Suspenson of the Absolute Power of
Alienation m 1 REPoRTs REcomENDATioNs A STUDMs (1956). See also Turrentine,
The Suspension Rule and Other Statutory Restrwtions on Trusts and Future Interests in
California, 9 HASTINGS L.J. 262 (1958).
1 7 See Cal. Stat. 1959, ch. 470.
Is Fraser & Sammis, supra note 5, at 116.
19 CALFORNYA Lw REVISION CoImsiSO , op. cit. supra note 16, at G-8.
20 See Snvms, op. cit. supra note 3, at § 145.
2 1 CA~Iaswo - Lw REVisION CommmsioN, op. cit. supra note 16, at C-8.
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enacted -as a part of -the 1959 reform. That section, which is still in
force, reads as follows:
A trust is not invalid, either in whole or in part, merely because
the duration of the trust may exceed the time within which future
interests in property must vest under this title, if the interest of all
the beneficiaries must vest, if at all, within such time.
If a trust is not limited in duration to the time within which fu-
ture interests in _property must vest under tis title, a provision,
express or implied, in the instrument creating the trust that the trust
may not be terminated is ineffective insofar as it purports to be
applicable beyond such time. A provision, express or implied, in an
instrument creating an inter vivos trust that the trust may not be ter-
minated shall not prevent termination by the joint action of all the
creators of the trust and all of the beneficiaries thereunder if all con-
cerned are competent and if the beneficiaries are all of the age of
majority.
Whenever a trust has existed longer than the time within which
future interests in property must vest under this title
(1) It shall be terminated upon the request of a majority of the
beneficiaries.
(2) It may be terminated by a court of competent jurisdiction
upon the petition of the Attorney General or of any person who
would be affected thereby if the court finds that such termination
would be in the public interest or in the best interest of a majority
of the persons who would be affected thereby.
While it deviates somewhat from the rule which has been referred to,
this legislation appears to be a satisfactory solution of the problem.
Legislation of 1963
The perpetuities legislation of 1963 appears to be a manifestation
of a statutory reform movement, observable in a number of other states
as well as in the British commonwealth, to mitigate the harshness of
the common law rule.22 In California it also may have been inspired by
a desire to eliminate the harshness of the doctrine laid down m Hag-
gerty v. City of Oakland,23 which is discussed at a later point in this
paper. '
This legislation .includes four separate provisions, each of which is
apparently designed to accomplish a somewhat different purpose.
These four will be considered separately, on the assumption that they
are all constitutional. Then, since a question of validity under the Cali-
22 See Snvms, op. cit. supra note 3, at §§ 124-26.
23 161 Cal. App. 2d 407, 326 P.2d 967 (1958).
24See authorities cited note 55 infra.
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forma constitution may be raised, at least as to two of them, that
question will be considered in conclusion.
(a) Reformation Cy Pres
One of the-principal criticisms of the common law rule against per-
petuities which has been made In recent years, is that the consequences
of a violation are unduly harsh. Thus, it has been commonly held that,
if a contingent interest violates the rule, it is totally void; whereas it
is argued that it should be possible to give effect to the settlor's intent
as nearly as possible (cy pres), by reforming the instrument to con-
form to the rule, in such a manner as the settlor would have preferred
had he known of the violation. The subsection designed to effectuate
this reform is as follows: 2 5
No interest in real or personal property is either void or voidable
as in violation of Section 715.2 [the section which declares the com-
mon law rule against perpetuities] of this code if and to the extent
that it can be reformed or construed within the limits of that section
to give effect to the general intent of the creator of the interest when-
ever that general intent can be ascertained. This section shall be lib-
erally construed and applied to validate such interest to the fullest
extent consistent with such ascertained intent.
This is similar to legislation enacted in a few other states.2" Indeed,
it has been contended that the same result can be accomplished by
judicial decision.2 7 At least one recent case actually does this. s
Much can be said for this piece of legislation. After all, to strike
down completely the provision of the settlor's instrument is difficult to
justify, where it is possible to give effect to a similar limitation which
the court can be Yeasonably sure the settlor would have preferred to
total invalidity About the only thing which can be said against such
a reformation by judicial decree is that it permits a judge with little
knowledge of the law of estates and future interests to rewrite the will.
But with the assistance of competent counsel, the court should not go
far wrong. And, in any event, what the court does will probably be
preferred to total invalidity
25 CAL. Cxv. CODE § 715.5 (added by Cal. Stat. 1963, ch. 1455, § 4).
26 As to this legislation, see Snvms, op. cit. supra note 3, at § 130.
2 7 Browder, Construction, Reformation and the Rule against Perpetuities, 62 MicH.
L. Rtrv. 1 (1963); Leach, Perpetuities: Cy Pres on the March, 17 VAND. L. REv. 1381
(1964); Quarles, The Cy Pres Doctrine: Its Application to Cases Involving the Rule
Against Perpetuities and Trusts for Accumulation, 21 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 384 (1946).
28 Carter v. Berry, 243 Miss. 321, 140 So. 2d 843 (1962). See also Estate of Foster,
190 Kan. 498, 376 P.2d 784 (1962). An earlier decision also applied this doctrine.
Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 31 Ad. 900 (1891).
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(b) Sixty'Year' Perod r Gross
Another section of the legislation of 1963 reads as follows: 29 "No
interest in real or personal property which must vest, if at all, not later
than 60 years after the creation of the interest violates Section 715.2
of this code." This .provision was doubtless suggested by the 1956
Report of the English Law Reform Committee on the Rule Against
Perpetuities3 0 This recommendation of the English Law Reform
Committee has since been enacted into law in England,-3 Western
Australia,32 and New Zealand.33 The text of the English provision, as
enacted by Parliament, is m part as follows: 84 " . where the mstrt,-
ment by which any disposition is made so provides, the perpetuity
period applicable to the disposition under the rule against perpetuities,
instead of being of any other duration, shall be of a duration equal to
such number of years not exceeding eighty as is specified in that behalf
in the instrument." According to the report of the English Committee,
this was recommended to take the place of -the so-called "royal lives"
clause, which was then frequently used by legal draftsmen. Such a
clause expressly limited the duration of a trust, or the time of vesting
of a future interest, to the time when the last survivor of all the descen-
dants of some designated recent English monarch, who were alive at
the time the will or trust instrument in question took effect, should die,
and a period of twenty-one years thereafter. Royal lives were, of
course, used, because accurate records were generally available as to
who they were and when each died. However, this was not always the
case.35 And, as the English Report states,36 "Even if all the designated
royal lives can be ascertained, it may well be difficult and expensive
to discover the date on,which the last of them dropped." The enact-
ment of the eighty year provision was thought to woo the bar away
from the use of the "royal.lives" clause, and'thus to avoid its difficulties.
It should be' noted that, according to the English statute, the eighty
year period can only be applied if the mstrument specifies it, and then
it is to be used to the exclusion of the common law period of lives in
being and twenty-one years. But in the Califorma statute there is no
29 CA . Crv. CODE § 715.6 (enacted by Cal. Stat. 1963, d. 1455, § 5).
80 Law Reform Committee, Fotkrth Report, Cm. No. 18, at 6-7 (1956).
81 Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, 13 Eliz. 2, c. 55.
32 Law Reform (Property, Perpetuities, and Succession), 1962, 11 Eliz. 2, No. 83
(W Austl.).
33 Perpetuities Act, 1964, 13 Eliz. 2, No. 47 (N.Z.).
34 Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, 13 Elfiz. 2, c. 55, § 1.
35 See In re Villar, [1929] 1 Ch. 243.
36 Law Reform Committee, op. cit. supra note 30, at 6.
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such restriction. Not only is the period sixty years instead of eighty,
but there is no requirement that the instrument specify that this period
is being used, nor that it must be used to the exclusion of the common
law period. It seems clear, indeed, that the sixty year period of the
Califorma statute is merely an alternative period, and that its effect is
to validate the instrument if contingent limitations will vest either
within the sixty year period or within lives in.being and twenty-one
years; and this is true whether the draftsman indicated .that he was
using that period.or not. Thus, on an average, there will be more cases
held valid under the rule than there were before,
The writer believes that, on the whole, this new legislation is un-
desirable. The period of lives in being and twenty-one years permits a
sufficiently extensive tying up of .property, without extending the pe-
riod by a new alternative. It is true, the use of the sixty year period
may sometimes be easier to handle than a period of lives in being and
twenty-one years. And it may be said that, after all, a period of average
lives plus twenty-one years is no longer than a period of sixty. years.
It is also true that some types of provisions are not likely to involve
any lives in being, and then the common law period is merely twenty-
one years. It is arguable that, w such a situation a longer period in
gross, such as sixty years, should be permissible. But is there any situa-
tion where a period as long as sixty years is needed, there being no
lives in being involved? It may be said that an option contract in a
case in point. But is there any real need.for options to purchase land
winch may last longer than twenty-one years? The writer believes that
the answer is no.3
Nor would it seem desirable to qualify the use of the longer period
in gross as the English have done, requiring that the instrument specify
that the period is used and that no alternative period can then be used.
If this were done, American draftsmen would be likely to be unaware
of these restrictions on the use of the sixty year period, and would
often fail to bring the terms of an instrument within them when they
intended to do so. In England the drafting of such instruments as are
here considered is largely in the hands of a highly skilled group of
specialists who doubtless would be aware of the precise scope of the
restrictions on the use of the eighty year period. But, since tins is not
the case in the United States, the English restrictions on the use of the
period would probably give rise to difficulties.
37 The English Act does not apply the eighty year period provision to an option to
purchase land. In that case the period is only twenty-one years. Perpetuities and Ac-
cumulations Act, 1964, 13 Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 9.
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(c) The "Unborn Widow" Case
Another clause of the 1963 act involves what Professor Leach has
felicitously described as the "unborn widow" case. 8 The language of
the clause is as follows: 3 "In determining the validity of a future inter-
est in real or personal property pursuant to Section 715.2 of this code,
an individual described as the spouse of a person in being at the com-
mencement of a perpetuities period shall be deemed a 'life in being' at
such time whether or not the individual so described was then in
being." The following case illustrates the sort of situation which this
clause was designed to remedy. A devises land on trust for his son B
for life, and then for such widow as B shall leave surviving hin, for
her life, and then to distribute to the children of B who are living at
the death of such widow: Cases have commonly held that the-con,
tingent limitation to the children of B violates the common law rule
against perpetuities. For B might marry a woman who was not in
being at the testator's death, and she might live more than twenty-one
years after the death of B. Thus the remainder to the children of B
would not vest until more than twenty-one years after B's death, the
only available life in being. If B's wife had been in being at the testa-
tor's death, and had been referred to as such, then the limitation to
the children, which would vest on her death, would be valid. The new
statutory provision says that B's widow is deemed to be a life in being
even if she is not a life in being. This may seem anomalous; but it is
believed to be good sense. Such a limitation is the kind of slip drafts-
men not infrequently make. If we view the validity of the limitation
at its inception, we must then say that it is possible that B might marry
a woman who was unborn at the time of testator's death. But as a
practical matter, this is very unlikely to happen. The new stafute vali-
dates the numerous cases where the widow turns out to be a life in
being, as well as those extremely rare cases where she was not a life
in being.
New Concept of Vesting
Probably the most thoroughly unique and completely revolutionary
provision in the legislation of 1963 is Section 715.8, which reads in
part as follows:40
"An interest in real or personal property, legal or equitable, is
vested if and when there is a person in being who could convey or
38 See Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HAnv. L. 11Ev. 638, 644 (1938).
89 CAL. Civ. CODE § 715.7 (enacted by Cal. Stat. 1963, oh. 1455, § 6, at 3009).
40 CAL. Civ. CODE § 715.8 (enacted by Cal. Stat. 1963, ch. 1455, § 7, at 3010).
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there are persons in being, irrespective of the nature of their respective
interests, who together could convey a fee simple title thereto."
As a part of the legislative act in which this provision was included
there was a clause repealing Sections 693-95 of the California Civil
Code, which, since 1872, had constituted the definitions of vested and
contingent future interests. The repealed sections are as follows:
§ 693. Kinds of Future Interests. A future interest is either:
1. Vested; or
2. Contingent.
§ 694. Vested Interests. A future interest is vested when there is
a person in being who would have a right, defeasible or indefeasible,
to the Immediate possession of the property, upon the ceasing of the
intermediate or precedent interest.
§ 695. Contingent Interests. A fature interest is contingent,
whilst the person m whom, or the event upon which, it is limited to
take effect remains uncertain.
It would appear that, under the guise of a new definition of vested
and contingent future interests, the new section has in fact eliminated
any rule against remoteness of vesting, and has provided a test of
suspension of the power of alienation in determining the validity of
future interests. This is a step backward. As has been seen,4 1 suspension
of the power of alienation was entirely eliminated from our code in
1959 because it was thought to be undesirable. It is true, a major ob-
jection to it at that time was that rules restricting the suspension of
the power of alienation unduly restricted the duration of trusts; and
clearly the new section establishes a rule of suspension of the power
of alienation only with respect to contingent future interests, but does
not concern itself with the duration of equitable vested interests in
trusts. Nevertheless, a rule dealing solely with- suspension of the power
of alienation, without any restriction on those contingent future inter-
ests which do not suspend the power of alienation, is undesirable.
Two examples will show how this is so. A conveys land "to B in fee
simple, but if the land is ever used for business purposes, then to C in
fee simple." If the executory interest limited to C is valid, it may tie
up the property and prevent a clear title for an indefinitely long period
of time. It is true, B and C could unite in conveying in fee simple
absolute; hence there is no suspension of the power of alienation.
Moreover, C's interest is valid as a "vested" interest under the new
statutory provision. But clearly it does tie up property For while B
41 Cal. Stat. 1959, Ch. 470.
42 Sndns, Ftrruam LmEsTs 268 (2d ed. 1966).
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and C could unite in conveying in fee simple absolute, they are not
likely to do so, since they will have difficulty in evaluating their re-
spective interests.42 Or suppose A, owning land in fee sumple absolute,
executes for valuable consideration, an instrument, covenanting on be-
half of hunseIf, his heirs and assigns, that B, his heirs, and assigns, shall
have an option for 1,000 years to buy the land for $10,000. Under the
common law rule against perpetuities, the option would be regarded
as invalid,48 since A is trying to give B a contingent, equitable interest
in the land, which may not vest for 1,000 years. Yet the option does
not suspend the power of alienation, and, under the new statutory
provision, it would apparently be good. Indeed, the new statutory pro-
vision results in tis: If the only contingent, future interests found in
a deed or will are limited to definite ascertained persons, the rule
against perpetuities is not violated. The contingent future interests are
saved-by the use of a fiction in accordance with wich they are deemed
vested.
That a rule solely against the suspension of the power 6f alienation
is .inadequate to prevent the tying up of property for an unreasonably
long time, has been recognized by the courts of this state and of other
states. Thus, as has been seen, before the common law rule against
perpetuities was declared in this state in statutory form, the courts
concluded that the common law rule against perpetuities, as a rule
of remoteness of vesting, was in force by virtue of a provision of the
California constitution. And in New York and some other states, where
statutory rules as to the suspension of the power of alienation have
been in force, courts have seemed ready to find, on one ground or
another, that there is also a rule against remoteness of vesting.44
But even if we were to concede that the only rule restricting the
tymg up of property by future interests should be a rule as suspension
of the power of alienation, it is most unsatisfactory to state it in the
form of a new definitaon of vesting. From time immemorial the term
"contingent," when applied to future interests, has meant "subject to
a condition precedent." It is hard to see how such an interest can truly
be said to be vested merely because of the new clause in the statute.4
48 The leading English case to this effect is London & S.W Ry. v. Gomm, 20 Ch.
D. 562 (1882). To the same effect is 4 RESTATEmmNT,, nonRTY §§ 393-94 (1944).
44 See generally Snvms & Sm=rr, FuTuam INTERESTS, ch. 41 (2d ed. 1956).
45 It is believed that the Califorma Supreme Court, wnch has recognized that a
rule against remoteness of vesting is declared by the California constitution, is not going
to conclude that we still have a rule against remoteness of vesting enacted in the civil
code, just because the legislature has re-defined vesting in terms of suspension of the
power of alienation.
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Constitutionality of the 1963 Legislation -
Subsequent to the enactment of the 1963 legislation, a question -has
been raised as to the constitutionality of some of its provisions.46 This
applies particularly to the provision embodying a new definition of
vesting, and may apply to the sixty year provision. As has been seen,
it has been held that the California: constitution of 1879, with its pro-
vision to the effect that "no perpetuities shall be allowed except for
eleemosynary purposes," means that the common law rule against per-
petuities, as a rule restricting the vesting of a contingent future interest
to a period of lives in being and twenty-one years, is in force.
Just what is the precise scope of this doctrine, as declared -by the
California courts, is none too clear. Certainly a number of California
eases have declared that the common law rule against perpetuities, as
a rule against remoteness of vesting, is in force by reason of our consti-
tution, and at least two cases have so held.47 These is no square deci-
sion on this point by the Supreme Court of California. But in Estate
of McCray,48 the Supreme Court said: "The rule against restraints on
alienation [obviously referring to the statutory rule against suspension
of the power of alienation] has been, in some cases, confused with the
rule against perpetuities; but the two rules, while having the same end
in view, viz., that of preventing undue interference with the freedom
of transfer of property, are of entirely different origin and application.
The rule against perpetuities, engrafted upon our system by the con-
stitution, relates only to future interests in property, the vesting of
which is to be postponed beyond the allotted time. The rule relating
to restraints on alienation, on the other hand,, is statutory in origin,
and has reference to an undue prevention of the transfer of estates
already vested."
Does the view of the California courts on the effect of the constitu-
tional provision mean (a) that the common law rule against remote-
46 38 CAL. S.B.J. 641 (1963); Comment, The Quest for the Best Vest, 37 So. CAL.
L. BRE. 283, 292 (1964) (contending that the constitutional provision is merely a state-
ment of policy).
4 7 Estate of Sablender, 89 Cal. App. 2d 329, 201 P.2d 69 (1948); Dallapi v. Camp-
bell, 45 Cal. App. 2d 541, 114 P.2d 646 (1941). Other recent dicta to the same effect
are found in Haggerty v. City of Oakland, 161 Cal. App. 2d 407, 326 P.2d 957 (1958)
and in Victory Oil Co. v. Hancock Oil Co., 125 Cal. App. 2d 222, 270 P.2d 604 (1954).
48204 Cal. 399, 406, 268 Pac. 647, 650 (1928). But see Estate of Micheletti, 24
Cal. 2d 904, 908, 151 P.2d 833, 835 (1944) where the court, by way of dictum, indi-
cates some doubt. However, it has been noted that a hearing before the Supreme -Court
was thereafter demed in Estate of Sablender, 89 Cal. App. 2d 329, 201 P.2d 69 (1948)
which was a square decision in accord with the view that the constitution enacts the
common law rule.
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ness of vesting is thereby enacted in all its details,49 or (b) does it
merely announce a general -policy against permitting the tying up of
property for an unreasonable time,50 or (c) does it mean that the com-
mon law rule is enacted only in substance, but that this does not pre-
vent the legislature from modifying it in some particulars, so long as
it can still be said to be the common law rule against perpetuities? The
second interpretation cannot be taken without a square departure
from the doctrine as laid down in a number of cases. It would seem
that the third interpretation is the acceptable one in the light of these
cases. If we were to say that the constitution enacts the common law
rule against perpetuities, with all its details, exactly as it existed in
1849 or in 1879, then all the minor statutory amendments, such as
those concerning pension and profit sharing trusts and trusts to main-
tam a cemetery lot,51 would seem to be void. Yet these statutes merely
supplement the rule. They still leave us with the common law rule
against remoteness of vesting. Indeed, it is unthinkable that our courts
would hold that the common law rule against perpetuities, as it existed
when the constitution was enacted, cannot be changed in the minutest
detail without a constitutional amendment. Thus, judged by the third
test suggested, the 1963 legislation involving the reformation of an
49 This seems to have been the view of the court of appeal in the case of Estate of
McCray, referred to in the preceding note. The opinion in the court of appeal is re-
ported in 260 Pac. 940 (1927). The case involved a will in which the'testator sought to
set up a trust for a period of ten years. At that time the statute was in-force permitting
a suspension of the power of alienation for twenty-five years, or in the alternative, for-
lives in being and a possible minority in certain cases. The period of lives in being and
a restricted minority had been a part of the statute since 1872. The- twenty-five year
alternative had only been added by amendment in 1917. This court held the trust void
on the following -line of reasoning. The constitution enacted the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities, with its period of lives -in being and twenty-one years. The legislature could
further restrict the period, but it could not lengthen the period. Hence, the amendment
permitting a period in gross not to exceed twenty-five years was unconstitutional. And
the only rule was the prior statute -without any period in gross unconnected with an
actual minority. It is true that Supreme Court reversed, pointing out that the court of
appeal had confused the statutes as to suspension of the power of alienation, and the
constitutional provision which was said to concern remoteness of vesting, and that there-
fore the 1917 legislation was constitutional, and the trust was valid. But the fact re-
mains that the Supreme Court did not deny that the twenty-one year period was a part
of the rule of remoteness of vesting, impliedly enacted by the constitution.
50 Tis is the view favored in the following: Burby, The Meaning of the Constitu-
tional Provision Prohibiting Perpetuities, 1 So. CAL. L. REV. 107 (1928); Gerdes,
"Perpetuities" and the California Rule Against Suspension of the Absolute Power of
Alienation, 16 CALiF. L. REv. 81 (1928); Comment, 37"So. CAL. L. REv, 283 (1964).
51 As to such amendments, see CAL. Crv. CODE § 715.3 (profit-sharing or retire-
ment trusts); CAL. CIV. CODE § 715.4 (isurance trusts); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 8776 (maintenance of cemetery lot).
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otherwise void limitation, and that dealing with the "unborn widov"
case, are constitutional. For we still have the common law rule against
perpetuities after their enactment.
The provision stating a new concept of vesting is believed to be
different. As has been seen, the effect of this is to substitute the con-
cept of suspension of the power of alienation for that of remoteness
of vesting. If we arc- to-rely on declarations of our courts that the con-
stitution enacts a rule against remoteness of vesting, then the change
in the concept of vesting so as to make it mean suspension of the
power of alienation would seem to mean that we no longer have a rule
against perpetuities.
What about the alternative sixty year provision? It is doubtful
whether its existence means that we no longer have the rule against
perpetuities. What we have is the common law rule plus an alternative
period, which would not, on an average, be longer than the common
law period of lives m being and twenty-one years. On the other hand,
it may be said that the only period in gross recogmzed as a part of the
common law rule is twenty-one years. And it may be pointed out that,
in the McCray case, the opinion m the Court of Appeal did regard the
twenty-one year period as an essential part of the rule.52
Important Decisions Since 1951
Five important decisions of the Califorma courts on perpetuities
questions, decided since 1951, have been selected for discussion. Two
of these concern the question of liberal or strict construction of a
limitation for purposes of determining whether the interest will neces-
sarily vest with the period of the rule. Two of them involve oil and
gas leases. The other concerns the validity of an appointment under
a testamentary power.
An important part of the common law rule against perpetuities is
the doctrine that the validity of a limitation is to be determined as of
the time of inception of the instrument, on the basis of what might
possibly happen, not what probably would happen. Indeed, earlier
cases usually applied this doctrine with great severity Cray declared
that "every provision m a will or settlement is to be construed as if
the Rule did not exist, and then to the provision so construed the Rule
is to be remorselessly applied."53 But, by the time the American Law
Institute published its Restatement concerning the rule against per-
petuities, the law was declared therein to favor a legally more effec-
52 See note 49, supra.
53 G&Y, RuLE AG3NsT P EapExurrims § 629 (4th ed. 1942).
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tive construction of an ambiguous limitation, for purposes of deter-
mining its validity under the rule.5" In a number of jurisdictions,
however, the old doctrine, as stated by Gray, continued to be followed.
This was true in California.
Thus, in Haggerty v. City of Oakland,55 the validity of a lease for
years to-arise in the -future was involved. The lease by its terms was
to begin after the construction of a certain building and not until the
first day of the calendar. month next succeeding thirty days after notice
to the lessee that the building was substantially completed. The court,
following-the earlier doctrine just.stated, held that'the lease violated
the rule against perpetuities, since it was not certain that the building
would be completed within lives in being and twenty-one years. As
the court said:
It is dso well settled that, in determining whether or not the rule
applies, the courts have no power to consider reasonable probabilities
or possibilities, or to consider what has happened after the creation
of the interest. If, at the time of the creation of the interest, there
exists any possibility at all that the interest involved may not vest
within the prescribed period, the rule has been violated, and the
grant must fail.66
It has been indicated that the 1963 legislation which stated a new
defmition of vesting was designed to make valid such- a limitation as
was involved in the Haggerty case.57 If that be true, the legislature
might have been-saved the devious device which it employed to get
around the Haggerty case had it anticipated the decision of the Su-
preme Court of California in the case of Wong v. DiGrazia.5 8
The latter case was-practically on all fours with the Haggerty case.
It also involved an agreement for the lease of a building to commence
upon completion of the building. The court held that the rule against
perpetuities was not violated, and expressly overruled the holding in
the Haggerty case. As the court said:
54 4 RE TATEmmNT, .PRoPERTY § 375 (1944).
65 161 Cal. App. 2d 407, 326 P.2d 967 (1958), 47 CasF. L. REv. 197 (1959), 10
I-ASMrcs L.J. 439 (1959), 39 N.C.L. REv. 93 (1960), 35 N.D.L. FRv. 170 (1959),
6 U.C.L.A.L. BEv. 165 (1959). Tls case is also discussed m Leach, Perpetuities New
Absurdity, Judicial and Statutory Correctives, 73 IIAv. L. REv. 1318 (1960) and
Sparks, A Decade of Transition in Future Interest, 45 VA. L. R-v. 493, 501 (1959).
56161 Cal. App. 2d at 418, 326 P.2d at 964.
5 7 See Comment, The Quest for the Best Vest, 37 So. CAL. L. REv. 283, 284 n.8
(1964).
5860 Cal. 2d 525, 35 Cal. Rptr. 241, 386 P.2d 817 (1963), 1964 DuxF, L.J. 645,
16 HAsTms L.J. 470 (1965), 24 MD. L. REv. 356 (1964), 25 Oro ST. L.J. 606
(1964), 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 246 (1964).
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Courts and scholars almost unanimously agree that provisions which
made vesting contingent upon performance within a reasonable time,
or some equivalent phrase, do not violate the rule "if, in the light of
the surrounding circumstances, as a matter of construction 'a reason-
able time! is necessarily less than twenty-one years." (3 Sums &
SMrr, FuTumE INIrwsrs (2d ed. 1956) § 1228 at p. 122.) 59
The two cases involving oil and gas leases should be considered
together. In Victory Oil Co. v. Hancock Oil Co.,60 it appeared that
Berry conveyed the land in question to Tucker, "excepting therefrom
and reserving to the grantors and their successors in interest all oil,
gas, . and other minerals on or under the said described lands." The
deed provided that, if oil, gas or other minerals shall not be found in
paying quantities within five years, all rights of the grantors in said
land should cease; and if oil, gas or other minerals should be found
within the five year period, the rights of the grantors should continue
for a period of twenty years and so long thereafter as oil, gas or other
minerals shall be produced in pa'ying quantities. Berry executed an
oil and gas lease, which came into the ownership of the Hancock Oil
Company. This suit involved a determination of the state of the title.
Certain defendants, who were successors of Tucker, the original
grantee, contended that the title of fBerry had ceased in accordance
with the limitations of the original deed, some of the oil wells having
been abandoned and another located on adjoining land' The court
held that the interest of the grantee, Tucker, was void under the rule
against perpetuities. The contention was made by counsel that the
conveyance to Tucker contained a reservation to the grantor, not an
exception, and that therefore the rule was not violated. Apparently
the distinction referred to was this. If A conveys to B in fee simple,
excepting a possessory interest for so long as oil and gas are found in
paying quantities, this would have left a determinable fee in the
grantor had'it been created in some one other than the conveyor. But
no determinable fee can arise in the grantor, and so the grantor had
conveyed to the grantee an executory interest m the nature of a spring-
ing use, which is subject to the rule against perpetuities."' On the
other hand, if A has conveyed to B in fee simple, reserving to the
grantor an incorporeal interest, known as a profit a prendre, which is
to last so long as oil and gas are found in paying quantities, B has a
59 Wong-v. DiGrazia, supra note 58, at 536-37, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 249, 386 P.2d at
825.
60 125 Cal. App. 2d 222, 270 P.2d 604 (1954).
61 See Walker v. Marcellus & O.L. Ry., 226 N.Y. 347, 123 N.E. 736 (1919); SnmAs
& Sirrn, FuunE INTm EsTs § 284 (2d ed. 1956).
January, 1967] PERPETUITIES IN CALIFORNIA
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
present, possessory fee simple, which, being vested, cannot be subject
to the rule against perpetuities; and the grantor has a determinable
interest in a profit0 2 When the grantor's interest ceases because oil and
gas are no longer found in paying quantities, the profit simply term-
nates, leaving the grantee with a fee simple absolute. Here the court
declared that the grantor had attempted to limit an exception to hin-
self,63 and that therefore, the granted interest was void under the rule
against perpetuities, leaving the grantor with a fee simple absolute
subject to the lease he had given. Whether the court fully appreciated
the significance of this conclusion may, however, be doubted m view
of the incomprehensible observation that "even if this were held to be
a reservation the rule of Dallapz v. Campbell, 45 Cal. App. 2d 541, 545,
would be persuasive, the court there finding a reservation of a profit
a prendre to be a violation of the rule against perpetuities, and there-
fore void and of no effect."64
Four years after the decision in the Victory Oil Company case, the
Supreme Court decided the case of Brown v. Terra Bella Irrigation
Distrzct,65 which, though similar to the Victory Oil Company case with
respect to the facts involved, was held by the court to be distinguish-
able. Here, also, a deed conveyed to the defendant a fee sunple, re-
serving oil, gas and other minerals to the grantor for a period of twenty-
five years and as long thereafter as oil, gas or petroleum products shall
be produced in paying quantities. The deed contained a further provi-
sion that, "subject to the reservations and conditions aforesaid," the
grantor grants to the grantee all reversion and reversions, remainder
and remainders in said property No minerals were ever found. This
was a suit to quiet title and for other relief. Plaintiff was the successor in
interest of the grantor, his contention being that the interest of the
grantee defendant was void under the rule of the Victory Oil Com-
pany case, the provision for the retention of oil and gas rights by the
grantor being an exception not a reservation. The court found for the
6 2 See Smnrs & Smrnm, op. cit. supra note 61, at § 1248.
68 If this was an exception, then the grantor retained a possessory fee simple in the
oil and gas in place. If it was a reservation, he only retained a right to take oil and gas,
in the nature of a profit a prendre. Califorma authority would indicate that the usual
oil and gas lease creates in the lessee a profit a prendre, -not a possessory interest in oil
and gas in place. See Dabney v. Edwards, 5 Cal. 2d 1, 53 P.2d 962 (1935).64 The court was incorrect in saying that. a profit was reserved in Dallaps v. Camp-
bell. What the court held in that case was that a power was reserved by the grantor in
the nature of a special power of appointment, which might not be exercised within the
period of the Rule Against Perpetuities, and therefore was void.
6551 Cal. 2d 33, 330 P.2d 775 (1958), 11 HAsTmGs L.J. 197 (1959), 58 Miio.
L. REv. 285 (1959).
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defendant, determining that there was no violation of the rule against
perpetuities. In its opinon the court declared that it was unnecessary
to decide whether the provision concerning oil and gas was an excep-
tion or a reservation. For, said the court, even if it were an exception,
making the conveyance to the grantee a void executory interest under
the rule of the Victory Oil Company case, there would be a possibility
of reverter as well as a determinable fee in the grantor; and this pos-
sibility of reverter, which was not subject to the rule against perpe-
tuities, was conveyed to the grantee by the later clause of the deed
conveying to the grantee all reversions. It is npossible to understand
how the grantor could retain both a determinable fee and a possibility
of reverter. There can be no determinable fee in the grantor, and even
if there were both a determinable fee and a possibility of reverter in
the grantor, the possibility of reverter could not be deemed conveyed
by a later clause of the deed, since all clauses of the deed operate at
the same time.6 If this was an exception, then the grantee was given
an executory interest, which was void under the rule against perpe-
tuities. Of course, the case can be sustained on the ground that there
was a reservation of a profit a prendre,-and that therefore, the granted
interest was a present, possessory interest, which was valid under the
rule against perpetuities.
One other case deserves brief mention, although it lays down a
principle which has long been recognized in other jurisdictions. The
case of In re Bircrs Estate67 involved a will in which a wife gave her
husband a general testamentary power to dispose of her estate. The
husband died three months after the death of Ins wife, leaving a will
in winch he set up a trust limited to terminate "on the death of the
last survivor of my children and grandchildren living at the time of
my death, and the entire corpus and undistributed net income shall go
and be distributed to the children of my grandchildren per capita." At
the time of the husband's death, the same children, grandchildren and
children of grandchildren were living as were alive when his wife died.
The court held that the exercise of the power did not violate the rule
against perpetuities, since it was to be construed in the light of facts
existing when the power was exercised; although, being a power to
appoint by will only, the period was to be measured from the creation
66 It is true, there is one case which holds that a determinable fee can be devised
in one clause of a will, leaving a possibility of reverter in the testator's heirs, and that
the possibility of reverter can be devised by the residuary clause of the same will. See
Brown v. Independent Baptist Church, 325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E.2d 922 (1950). But see
the writer's comment on that case in 52 MicH. L. REv. 179 n.4 (1953).
67225 Cal. App. 2d 196, 37 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1964).
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of the power. This is the rule declared by the American Law Insti-
tute"8 and by decisions in other states. 69 It has nothing to do with the
so-called "wait-and-see" doctrine, which has sometimes been vigorously
advocated in recent years.7 Rather, it merely means that the exercise
of the power, being the last step in the transactions designed to get
the property to the appointees, should be construed to mean what it
meant to the donee of the power at that time. And if, at the exercise
of the power, it was certain that the appointees would be determined
at the termination of the lives of children and grandchildren who were
lives in being when the power was created, then the exercise of the
power was good.
Conclusions
By way of conclusion and summary, it may be observed that the
legislature took a long step in the right direction in 1959; and that the
1963 legislation reached desirable results in the cy pres provision and
in the provision for the "unborn widow" case. As to the sixty year
period in gross, it is the writers opinion that it tendi unduly to lengthen
an already long permissible period for the rule. If any alternative
period in gross is recognized by legislative enactment, a period of
thirty years should be sufficient. As to the provision in the 1963 legis-
lation which redefines vesting m terms of suspension of the power of
alienation, it should be repealed. It is not only confusing, but also
fumdamentally unsound from the standpoint of basic policy The case
of Wong v. DiGrazd7i establishes a wholly desirable doctrine.
In the meantime, and until' repeal or amendment, the draftsman
and estate planner must live with the 1963 legislation. My advice to
hn is this: Do not risk drafting-an instrument which would be valid
only under the provisibns of'he sixty year clause, or of the clause de-
claring a new concept of vesting. The new provision as to vesting may
be held unconstitutional; and the court nght even strike down the
sixty year provision on the same ground. Until the Supreme Court of
Cafiforia has spoken, these two deviations from the common law rule
against perpetuities should" be viewed with suspicion.
58 4 RESTATEmmNT, NorEaO T § 392- (1944).
69 See cases cited SndEs & SMrtrH, FrtuRE INmEsTs § 1274 n.85 (2d ed. 1956).
7OAs to this doctrne, see Smms, FurtuRE ILvrmEsTS § 129 (2d ed. 1966).
71 See note 58 supra.
